COVID-19: a preliminary assessment of the European Union’s reaction by Dimitrakopoulos, Dionyssis G. & Lalis, Georgette
COVID-19:	a	preliminary	assessment	of	the	European
Union’s	reaction
How	well	has	the	European	Union	handled	the	Covid-19	pandemic?	Dionyssis	G.
Dimitrakopoulos	and	Georgette	Lalis	present	a	detailed	analysis	of	the	EU’s	actions
thus	far	in	the	outbreak.	They	write	that	despite	a	slow	and	initially	haphazard	approach,
there	has	ultimately	been	a	substantial	response.
Public	health	care	systems,	alongside	state	bureaucracies	and	public	finances,	are	being
tested	to	their	limits	by	the	Covid-19	pandemic.	The	same	can	be	said	–	albeit	in	a	different	way	–	about	the
European	Union.	Indeed,	since	the	problem	at	hand	knows	no	borders,	appealing	to	an	organisation	that	operates
at	the	‘supranational’	level	is	not	an	unreasonable	reaction	to	a	crisis	such	as	this	and	an	existential	threat	like	this
pandemic.	So,	how	has	the	EU	fared	thus	far	in	this	process?
In	what	can	only	be	a	preliminary	assessment,	we	argue	that	despite	not	having	the	legal	powers	to	deal	with	the
core	element	of	this	crisis	(which	started	as	a	health	issue	first	and	foremost),	the	EU	has	done	much	more	than
meets	the	eye	after	what	can	be	perceived	(albeit	not	fairly	–	see	below)	as	a	slow	start	that	has	been	marked	by
Christine	Lagarde’s	monumental	blunder	of	12	March	that	exacerbated	Italy’s	financial	problems	and	reportedly
forced	her	to	apologise	to	the	European	Central	Bank’s	Governing	Council.	Nevertheless,	the	jury	is	still	out
because	the	implementation	of	these	measures	will	necessarily	take	time.	Also,	many	of	them	(in	the	economic
sphere)	may	amount	to	nothing	short	of	a	paradigm	shift	and	opposition	will	not	give	up	that	easily	(see	below).
A	matter	of	legal	competence	alone?	Yes	and	no
The	treaty
Any	such	assessment	–	if	it	is	to	be	fair	–	must	start	from	the	issue	of	legal	competence	to	act	in	such	matters.	In
relation	to	the	pandemic’s	pure	public	health	basis,	it	is	important	to	note	that	there	is	no	common	EU	health	policy
in	place	because	organising	and	delivering	public	health	care	is	the	purview	of	national	governments.	Indeed,	until
1992	and	the	Maastricht	Treaty	(Art.	129)	the	EU	treaty	did	not	even	contain	a	direct	reference	to	public	health.
Post-Lisbon,	the	treaty	stipulates	that	while	the	Union’s	action	will	merely	complement	national	policies,	it	will	cover
(inter	alia)	‘the	fight	against	the	major	health	scourges,	by	promoting	research	into	their	causes,	their	transmission
and	their	prevention,	as	well	as	health	information	and	education,	and	monitoring,	early	warning	of	and	combating
serious	cross-border	threats	to	health’.	Nevertheless,	various	other	legal	provisions	have	been	used	to	regulate
health-related	issues	ranging	from	standards	for	medical	professions	to	pharmaceuticals,	medical	devices,	human
blood,	health	and	safety	at	the	workplace,	anti-cancer/tobacco	measures	and	last	but	not	least	free	movement	of
patients	and	the	famous	European	Health	Insurance	Card.
The	agencies
The	European	Medicines	Agency	seeks	to	facilitate	the	development	of	and	access	to	medicines,	evaluates
applications	for	marketing	authorisation,	contributes	to	monitoring	the	safety	of	medicines	across	their	lifecycle	and
disseminates	information	to	patients	and	professionals.	The	European	Centre	for	Disease	Prevention	and	Control
(ECDC)	is	the	EU	agency	that	–	since	its	establishment	in	2004	–	collaborates	with	national	health	authorities
across	Europe	so	as	to	‘identify,	assess	and	communicate	current	and	emerging	threats	to	human	health	posed	by
infectious	diseases’	by	means	of	the	collection,	assessment	and	dissemination	of	data,	the	provision	of	scientific
opinions	and	technical	assistance	(including	training)	and	fostering	the	exchange	of	information	and	best	practices.
In	case	of	a	pandemic,	the	Early	Warning	and	Response	System	links	the	European	Commission,	the	ECDC	and
the	European	Economic	Area’s	national	public	health	authorities	that	are	in	charge	of	countering	serious	cross-
border	threats	to	health,	and	it	is	used	‘for	notifications	on	outbreaks,	exchanging	information	and	decisions	about
the	coordination	of	measures	among	Member	States’,	including	in	cases	such	as	severe	acute	respiratory
syndrome	(SARS),	Ebola	virus	disease,	avian	influenza	in	humans	and	other	communicable	diseases.
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Although	the	European	Commission	has	established	the	procedure	whereby	alerts	(and	corresponding	measures)
are	notified	via	this	system	in	relation	to	serious	cross-border	threats	to	health,	ultimately	member	states	are	in
charge	of	making	and	implementing	the	decisions.	Earlier	this	month,	British	Prime	Minister	Boris	Johnson
reportedly	vetoed	the	Department	of	Health’s	request	to	retain	post-Brexit	access	to	this	system.	Finally,	EU
member	states	and	the	European	Commission	seek	to	co-ordinate	their	views	on	issues	under	discussion	by	the
World	Health	Organization.
There	are	other,	at	least	equally	significant,	ways	in	which	the	EU	affects	public	health	policy	in	case	of	a	pandemic
at	the	national	level.	After	all,	it	started	off	as	a	public	health	crisis	but	is	quickly	morphing	into	a	major	economic
and	social	crisis	too.	Three	out	of	the	four	single	market	freedoms,	namely	the	free	movement	of	persons,	services
and	goods	can	be	affected	by	the	pandemic,	including	export	bans	on	sensitive	public	health	products,	import
controls,	the	movement	of	health	professionals,	closing	of	frontiers	and	prohibition	of	citizens’	movement	around
Europe.
With	industrial	production	and	consumption	coming	to	a	halt,	and	workers	being	forced	to	stay	at	home,	action	is
required	on	the	economic	and	monetary	policy	fronts,	including	for	the	members	of	the	Euro	Area	that	must	comply
with	very	tight	limits	on	public	spending	and	borrowing.	Nevertheless,	these	countries	differ	in	terms	of	financial
wealth	and	the	capacity	of	their	national	health	care	systems.
So,	what	form	has	the	EU’s	response	to	the	COVID-19	pandemic	taken	thus	far?	Does	the	impression	match
reality?
An	initially	haphazard	but	ultimately	substantial	response
A	slow	start	in	relation	to	public	health?
The	bulk	of	this	response	begun	unfolding	in	March	although	the	ECDC	had	noted	as	early	as	on	9	January	reports
of	59	pneumonia	cases	‘possibly	associated	with	a	novel	coronavirus’	in	Wuhan,	China	that	has	direct	flight	links	to
London,	Paris	and	Rome	and	pointed	that	‘[c]onsidering	there	is	no	indication	of	human-to-human	transmission	and
no	cases	detected	outside	of	China,	the	likelihood	of	introduction	to	the	EU	is	considered	to	be	low,	but	cannot	be
excluded.	However,	more	epidemiological	and	laboratory	information	is	needed	in	order	to	elaborate	a
comprehensive	assessment	of	this	event	and	the	possible	risk	for	the	international	spread.’
The	ECDC	provided	further	updates	on	14	January	and	25	January,	in	the	latter	case	noting	a)	the	first	reported
(and	not	unexpected)	cases	within	the	EU	(all	with	a	direct	link	to	Wuhan),	b)	‘the	fact	that	these	cases	were
identified,	proves	that	detection	and	confirmation	of	this	novel	virus	is	working	in	France,	showing	a	high	level	of
preparedness	to	prevent	and	control	possible	infections	of	2019-nCoV’,	c)	the	fact	that	‘[m]ost	EU	countries	have
plans	and	measures	in	place	to	contain	this	kind	of	infection	and	Europe	has	well-equipped	laboratories	that	can
confirm	probable	cases	in	addition	to	hospitals	that	are	prepared	to	treat	patients	accordingly’	and	d)	urged	EU/EEA
countries	to	‘ensure	that	timely	and	rigorous	infection	prevention	and	control	measures	(IPC)	are	applied	around
people	diagnosed	with	2019-nCoV’.
The	ECDC	also	warned	that	‘it	is	likely	that	there	will	be	more	imported	cases	in	Europe.	Even	if	there	are	still	many
things	unknown	about	2019-nCoV,	European	countries	have	the	necessary	capacities	to	prevent	and	control	an
outbreak	as	soon	as	cases	are	detected.’	Three	days	later,	following	a	fourth	case	within	the	EU,	the	ECDC	was
noting	that	‘[t]he	source	of	infection	is	unknown	and	could	still	be	active.	Human-to-human	transmission	has	been
confirmed	but	more	information	is	needed	[…]	As	this	is	a	rapidly	evolving	situation,	ECDC	is	revising	its	risk
assessment	for	Europe.’	It	is	unclear	whether	or	the	extent	to	which	this	reaction	was	due	to	inadequate	information
and	the	alleged	cover	up	by	the	Chinese	authorities	of	aspects	of	the	problem.
A	series	of	decisions	(following	frequent	teleconferences	of	the	ministers	of	health	and	the	ministers	of	the	interior
of	the	27	member	states)	were	made	without	attracting	the	publicity	that	was	rightly	given	to	subsequent	measures
(see	below).	They	included	a	statement	(13	February,	i.e.	almost	a	month	before	the	WHO	declared	a	pandemic)	of
the	27	health	ministers	undertaking	to	seek	to	limit	the	damage	caused	by	the	virus	by	sharing	information,
resources	and	equipment	within	a	broader	cross-European	strategy	entailing	‘close	and	enhanced	coordination
between	Member	States	to	ensure	effectiveness	of	all	measures	(including	in	relation	to	diagnosis	and	treatment),
including,	if	necessary,	measures	regarding	travel,	while	safeguarding	the	free	movement	within	the	EU’	as	well	as
the	adoption	of	a	common	approach	seeking	to	limit	the	spread	of	the	virus	until	a	vaccine	becomes	available.
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This	approach	entails	tests	to	all	airline	passengers	entering	the	Union	via	all	major	airports,	extensive	lock-down
measures,	the	publication	of	detailed	information	on	national	capabilities	(such	as	stocks	of	ventilators,	drips,
intensive	care	beds	and	anti-viral	drugs)	and	a	decision	‘to	oversee	the	re-allocation	of	equipment	and	the	re-
distribution	of	healthcare	professionals	to	member	states	in	need’.	On	2	March	the	Croatian	presidency	escalated
the	Integrated	Political	Crisis	Response	(IPCR)	arrangements	from	information	sharing	mode	to	full	activation	mode
so	as	to	identify	major	gaps	across	sectors	and	elaborate	concrete	EU	response	measures.
Industrial,	trade	and	state	aid	measures
Rhetoric	as	well	as	decisions	that	have	highlighted	the	need	for	co-ordination	cannot	conceal	a	national	reflex
despite	the	cross-border	nature	of	the	pandemic.	For	example,	the	European	Commission,	in	addition	to	seeking	to
promote	a	co-ordinated	approach,	has	had	to	react	to	the	decision	of	individual	member	states	to	put	in	place
restrictions	to	the	export	of	‘an	increasing	range	of	products,	starting	with	Personal	Protective	Equipment	and
extending	more	recently	to	medicines	[…]	[that]	create	bottlenecks	to	production	of	essential	supplies	by	locking
inputs	in	specific	Member	States	[…],	ultimately	[…]	reintroduce	internal	borders	at	a	time	where	solidarity	between
Member	States	is	the	most	needed	and	they	put	obstacles	to	the	effective	protection	of	the	health	and	lives	of	all’.
Restrictions	such	as	these	have	subsequently	been	lifted	or	modified	in	accordance	with	the	Commission’s
observations	but	the	image	of	individual	states	acting	on	their	own	remains	very	potent	and	is	reflective	of	a	broader
trend	(see	below).	The	European	Commission	has	acknowledged	that	the	situation	in	Italy	has	been	‘exacerbated
by	the	fact	that	several	Member	States	have	adopted/are	adopting	national	measures,	such	as	export	bans,	which
seriously	disrupt	the	already	strained	supply	chain.	The	Commission	has	therefore	insisted	that	Member	States
refrain	from	adopting/implementing	such	untargeted	national	measures	and	requested	that	they	cooperate	for
implementation	of	an	effective	EU-wide	approach,	based	on	solidarity	among	Member	States.’	It	is,	however,	worth
noting	that	the	treaty	(Art.	36)	allows	some	prohibitions	or	restrictions	on	trade	if	‘justified	on	grounds	of	public
morality,	public	policy	or	public	security;	the	protection	of	health	and	life	of	humans,	animals	or	plants’	etc.	as	long
as	these	do	not	‘constitute	a	means	of	arbitrary	discrimination	or	a	disguised	restriction	on	trade	between	Member
States.’	It	is	difficult	to	argue	that	arbitrary	discrimination	applies	in	this	case.
On	10	March	the	European	Council	decided	to	a)	ask	the	Commission	to	analyse	the	needs	in	relation	to	the
provision	of	medical	equipment	and	to	propose	initiatives	to	prevent	shortages	(in	response	to	which	it	successfully
launched	joint	public	procurement	in	relation	to	personal	protective	equipment),	b)	agreed	to	ensure	that	the	internal
market	functions	properly	and	any	unjustified	obstacles	are	avoided	and	c)	declared	that	the	Union	and	the	member
states	‘stand	ready	to	make	use	of	all	instruments	that	are	necessary’.	On	19	March	the	European	Commission
decided	to	create	the	first	ever	strategic	‘rescEU’	stockpile	of	medical	equipment	(e.g.	ventilators,	personal
protective	equipment,	lab	supplies)	so	as	to	assist	EU	member	states	in	the	context	of	the	Covid-19	pandemic.
The	European	Commission	has	also	announced	the	adoption	of	rules	enabling	member	states	to	support	the
economy	by	making	full	use	of	the	flexibility	foreseen	under	the	EU’s	current	state	aid	regime	through	the	provision
of	liquidity	and	supporting	the	continuity	of	economic	activity	during	the	pandemic.	Specifically,	the	aforementioned
new	arrangement	provides	for	a)	direct	grants,	selective	tax	advantages	and	advance	payments;	b)	state
guarantees	for	company	loans	from	banks;	c)subsidised	public	loans	to	companies;	d)safeguards	for	banks	that
channel	state	aid	to	the	real	economy	and	e)short-term	export	credit	insurance.	It	has	subsequently	authorised
several	such	measures	from	a	broad	range	of	member	states.
In	addition,	the	European	Commission	has	instigated	the	release	of	the	European	standards	that	apply	to	crucial
medical	devices	and	personal	protective	equipment	(e.g.	masks,	gloves,	gowns)	thus	facilitating	the	task	of
companies	that	are	willing	to	swiftly	start	production	and	place	products	on	the	internal	market	more	easily	whilst
also	ensuring	safety.	Exceptionally,	it	has	also	authorised	the	placing	on	the	market	of	non-EU	marked	medical
equipment.
Freedom	of	movement
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The	national	approach	of	several	member	states	was	particularly	evident	in	this	area.	Restrictions	placed	on	the
movement	of	people	between	the	member	states	of	the	Schengen	area	were	announced	individually	although	they
do	reflect	a	previous	collective	decision	(see	supra).	By	24	March,	one	by	one	and	acting	individually,	a	total	of	14
Schengen	countries	(in	order	of	notification:	Austria,	Hungary,	Czechia,	Switzerland,	Denmark,	Poland,	Lithuania,
Germany,	Estonia,	Norway,	Portugal,	Spain,	Finland	and	Belgium)	had	informed	the	Commission	that	they	had
reinstated	border	controls	in	response	to	the	pandemic.	These	decisions	affect	in	particular	but	not	only	crossborder
workers.	Acting	in	a	more	systemic	manner,	the	Commission	proposed	temporary	restrictions	on	non-essential
travel	from	third	countries	into	the	EU,	which	the	European	Council	endorsed	politically	via	teleconference	on	17
March	and	the	member	states	are	gradually	putting	into	place.
Financing	the	economy:	a	paradigm	shift?
Despite	reported	opposition	from	(among	others	in	a	small	minority)	the	head	of	the	German	central	bank	who	as
recently	as	28	February	was	reportedly	saying	that	“This	is	a	very	complex	monetary	policy	issue	which,	in	my	view,
does	not	require	acute	monetary	policy	action”,	the	European	Central	Bank	launched	two	programmes,	namely:	a)
a	new	Pandemic	Emergency	Purchase	Programme	with	an	envelope	of	€750	billion	until	the	end	of	the	year,	which
has	had	a	direct	calming	effect	in	bond	markets;	and	b)	extra	net	asset	purchases	of	€120	billion	announced	on	12
March.	The	ECB	has	stated	that	it	will	do	whatever	it	takes	to	fight	the	expected	economic	consequences	of	the
pandemic	alongside	the	necessary	fiscal	effort	that	is	required	both	at	the	European	and	the	national	level.	As
Marcel	Fratzscher	points	out,	the	PEPP	programme	‘is	much	more	potent	than	some	have	realised	so	far,	and	in
many	ways	more	potent	than	the	OMT	programme’,	since	it	entails	no	conditionality,	it	is	more	flexible	and	the
issue/issuer	limit	of	33	per	cent	does	not	apply	to	it.
Predictably,	the	ECB’s	decision	has	already	come	under	attack	by	some	usual	suspects.	Be	that	as	it	may,	the	logic
of	the	ECB’s	plan	is	to	foster	financing	(including	to	SMEs	and	households)	as	well	as	–	as	its	chief	economist
pointed	out	–	to	ensure	that	if	necessary,	targeted	support	can	be	provided	(e.g.	to	Italy).	By	buying	debt	issued	by
governments	and	firms,	it	lowers	interest	rates	and	helps	governments	and	firms	borrow	and	invest,	thus	creating
jobs	and	raising	income.	Assuming	other	elements	of	the	ECB’s	asset	purchase	programme	remain	in	place,	this
amounts	to	more	than	1	trillion	euros	worth	of	purchases	this	year	and	the	monetisation	of	about	five	per	cent	of
GDP	in	Covid-19	public	debt	issuance.
Crucially,	for	an	institution	that	cares	about	its	reputation	as	much	as	it	does	about	its	effectiveness,	the	ECB’s
decisions	have	been	praised	by	a	broad	range	of	economists	(see,	for	example,	here,	here,	here,	here	and	here)
including	in	Germany,	and	have	the	support	of	French	President	Macron	but	prominent	economists	such	as	Paul	de
Grauwe,	Karl	Whelan,	Thomas	Philippon,	and	Luis	Garicano	argue	further	action	will	be	required.	For	example,	the
US	Senate	and	the	Trump	administration	have	reached	agreement	on	a	package	worth	2	trillion	dollars.
In	mid-March	the	ECB	also	announced	action	(in	tandem	with	other	central	banks	across	the	globe)	in	relation	to
currency	swap	lines	so	as	to	limit	the	risk	of	dislocation	in	the	financial	sector	and	a	potential	procyclical	reduction	of
bank	lending.	The	Commission	has	also	instigated	the	‘Coronavirus	Response	Investment	Initiative’	whereby	37
billion	euros	will	be	directed	from	the	EU’s	cohesion	budget	to	the	fight	against	the	coronavirus	crisis	and	proposes
to	extend	the	scope	of	the	EU	Solidarity	Fund	by	also	including	a	public	health	crisis	within	its	scope.
However,	the	most	path-breaking	act	is	the	European	Commission’s	proposal	(that	the	finance	ministers	of	the
member	states	have	endorsed)	to	activate	the	general	escape	clause	that	operates	since	2011	under	the	Euro
Area’s	Stability	and	Growth	Pact	so	as	to	enable	‘a	coordinated	and	orderly	temporary	deviation	from	the	normal
requirements	for	all	Member	States	in	a	situation	of	generalised	crisis	caused	by	a	severe	economic	downturn
either	in	Euro	Area	or	the	EU	as	a	whole.’	In	this	way	member	states	will	have	much	more	room	to	pursue	fiscal
policy	measures	commensurate	with	the	scale	of	the	crisis.
It	is	worth	noting	that	these	economic	measures	have	been	adopted	in	addition	to	the	national	measures	introduced
by	national	governments,	the	most	emblematic	of	which	is	the	German	government’s.	There	is	no	doubt	that	fiscal
policy	measures	too	are	needed	if	the	EU	is	to	limit	the	damage	done	by	the	pandemic,	as	Isabel	Schnabel	too,
pointedly	noted.
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Further	proposals	abound.	Hundreds	of	social	scientists	(including	prominent	figures	such	as	Thomas	Piketty	and
Mark	Blyth)	signed	an	open	letter	to	the	European	Council	(published	in	the	FT)	calling	for	Eurobonds.	Spain’s
Prime	Minister	Pedro	Sanchez	called	for	a	‘Marshall	Plan’	also	involving	joint	bonds.	He	is	one	of	nine	heads	of
state	or	governments	who	support	common	debt	issuance.	As	expected,	Dutch	PM	Mark	Rutte	opposes	them	as
does	Chancellor	Merkel.	No	wonder	the	teleconference	of	the	European	Council	on	26	March	ended	in	failure.
Martin	Sandbu	proposed	the	use	of	‘helicopter	money’.
Conclusion
As	is	always	the	case,	‘Brussels’	is	not	hard	to	blame	or	criticise.	On	this	occasion	though,	we	argue	that	criticism
must	be	confined	to	speed,	rather	than	the	substance.	After	a	slow	start,	the	EU	has	deployed	its	full	panoply
across	a	whole	range	of	policy	areas	in	an	effort	to	counter	the	devastating	consequences	of	this	pandemic.
As	Guy	Verhofstadt	rightly	noted,	‘Covid-19	showed	how	little	it	means	to	be	European	in	times	of	crisis.	It	made
one	thing	clear:	the	Eurosceptic	mantra	of	the	‘European	Superstate’	becoming	more	ridiculous	by	the	day.	People
see	the	European	Directorate	[sic]	for	Health	and	Food	Safety	and	the	European	Medicine	Agency	and	think:	they
have	the	tools	and	money,	why	don’t	they	act?	The	answer	is:	because	–	just	like	Europol	is	not	a	real	police	force
–	these	European	health	administrations	do	not	have	any	real	powers	to	act.	They	are	largely	–	you	get	it	–
“coordinating”	bodies;	assembling	information	and	data	from	all	over	Europe	and	sending	it	back	and	forth	between
member	states;	the	most	what	they	can	do,	is	issuing	recommendations.	What	is	absolutely	insufficient	in	times	of
pandemic.	Then	it	is	the	27	health	ministers	who	take	it	over	and	are	supposed	to	launch	decisive	collective	action.
Or	more	correctly	–	as	we	have	seen	–	mainly	fail	to	streamline	their	actions.’
The	national	tendencies	of	several	member	states	were	initially	quite	prominent.	Nevertheless,	as	Commissioner
Johansson	reportedly	noted,	in	this	crisis	EU	member	states	acted	like	humans	do	–	the	first	instinct	being	to	fend
for	themselves,	until	they	realised	the	value	of	cooperation.	It	remains	to	be	seen	whether	the	joint	action	that	has
followed	will	be	effective	but	there	are	some	lessons	that	the	EU	can	already	draw.
First,	those	who	–	like	Bill	Gates	–	have	been	arguing	that	the	West	ought	to	pay	much	more	attention	to	this	kind	of
issue,	clearly	have	a	point.	Second,	some	of	the	capability	that	the	Chinese	state	possesses	and	has	mobilised	to
counter	the	virus,	is	clearly	unwelcome	and	not	feasible	in	Europe.	This	does	not	mean	that	Europeans	cannot	be
educated	in	combatting	pandemics	so	that	the	next	one	finds	us	better	prepared.	Third,	capability-wise,	Europe
should	invest	in	new	medicines	(i.e.	R&D),	testing	materials,	and	the	security	of	supply	of	key	equipment	so	that
they	are	available	when	needed.	This	also	means	increasing	the	production	of	critical	equipment	within	the	EU.
Fourth,	the	EU	should	strengthen	its	decision-making	process	in	times	of	crisis	to	ensure	efficiency,	speed	and
visibility.	The	recent	proposal	made	by	the	President	of	the	European	Council	is	a	step	in	the	right	direction.
Subsidiarity	in	normal	times	is	fine	in	areas	where	competence	is	shared	between	levels	of	governance,	but	this
pandemic	is	a	cross-border	issue	that	can	be	better	handled	at	the	European	level	with	better	co-ordinated	and
science-based	decisions.	If	the	‘supranational’	centre	remains	weak	or	docile,	those	who	stand	to	lose	ultimately
include	EU	citizens	as	well	as	the	member	states	themselves.	So,	more	confidence	in	the	Commission’s	capacity	to
coordinate	would	be	welcome,	as	would	more	visibility	in	relation	to	its	activity.
Finally,	it	is	high	time	austerity	policies	were	reviewed	now	that	everyone	knows	that	it	has	undermined	public
health	systems’	ability	to	combat	pandemics.
________________
Note:	The	above	was	first	published	on	LSE	EUROPP.	Featured	image	credit:	by	Brian	McGowan	on	Unsplash.
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